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I. INTRODUCTION
Even though the relationship between a residential landlord and
tenant is a delicate one, oftentimes these arrangements go off without a
hitch. Occasionally, however, disputes between a landlord and a tenant
do arise, creating the need for courts to intervene. For example, when
there is a breakdown in the landlord-tenant relationship, or when the
tenant remains in the rental property after the lease has been terminated,
the landlord usually invokes the Eviction statute' to begin the legal
process of properly removing a tenant who is no longer welcome.
This Article provides an up-to-date summary of recent developments
in Kansas residential landlord-tenant law, including eviction law. More
than thirty years ago, in 1975, the Kansas legislature codified the Kansas
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRLTA), which, along with the
Eviction statute, regulates much of the landlord-tenant relationship.2 In
general, Kansas landlord-tenant and eviction law has not changed in the
last ten years.3  There has been fairly recent litigation, however,
concerning the landlord's proper return of the tenant's security deposit
Clinical Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law.
I. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-3801 to 61-3808 (2005).
2. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2540 to -2573 (2005). The Eviction statute was formerly called
the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute and was found at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-2301 to -2311.
Kansas courts have long regarded the residential lease as a contract subject to the parameters laid out
in the KRLTA.
See also the Kansas Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1992, which
parallels the KRLTA in many areas. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-25,100 to -25,127 (2005). The 1992
Act applies when the tenant owns the mobile home but leases the land upon which the home sits
from the landlord. When both the mobile home and space are rented from the same landlord, the
KRLTA applies.
3. See generally Stephen Kirschbaum, Prosecuting and Defending Forcible Entry and
Detainer Actions, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Sept. 1996, at 20 (providing an excellent and comprehensive
overview of the KRLTA and the Forcible Entry and Detainer (FED) Statute, which is now called the
Eviction statute); see also generally Lawrence R. McDonough, Wait a Minute! Residential Eviction
Defense Is Much More Than "Did You Pay the Rent?", 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 65 (2001)
(discussing the legal issues regarding eviction).
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after a tenancy has ended and the enforceability of liquidated damages
4clauses. The Kansas Court of Appeals has also considered whether a
tenant can be charged fees for late rent and the circumstances under
which a tenant may be assessed statutory damages for holding over. 5 In
addition to a few interpretive cases, there have been some statutory
changes, including the addition of section 58-2570(e) to the KRLTA,
which deals with documents or notices the landlord provides to the
tenant regarding the tenant's intent to vacate a rental property, 6 and the
revamping of the Eviction statute, located at sections 61-3801 though 61-
3808 of the Kansas Statutes. 7 As well, this Article discusses how the
impact of federal law on the practice of evictions, most notably the Fair
Debt Collections Practices Act and the recently amended Bankruptcy
Code, has brought to light the importance of understanding the effects of
federal law on state practice.
8
II. RECENT NOTEWORTHY KANSAS RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT
CASES
A. Landlord's Retention of Security Deposits: General Principles and
the Requirement ofActual Damages
In Kansas, one of the most litigated issues in the residential landlord-
tenant context involves return of the tenant's security deposit at the end
of the tenancy.9 A security deposit is defined as
4. See infra Part II.A.-.
5. See infra Part II.D.
6. See infra Part IlI.A.
7. See infra Part III.C.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See Geiger v. Wallace, 664 P.2d 846, 850 (Kan. 1983) (discussing damages awarded
against a landlord for not itemizing deductions from a security deposit); Clark v. Walker, 590 P.2d
1043, 1045 (Kan. 1979) (discussing the "constitutionality of provisions of the Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act"); A & S Rental Solutions, Inc. v. Kopet, 76 P.3d 1057, 1058 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003)
(determining whether a civil penalty can be levied under the statute governing the return of security
deposits); Heckard v. Martin, 958 P.2d 665, 668 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that a landlord has
thirty days to inspect the premises for damages deductible from the security deposit); Burgess v.
Stroud, 840 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (deciding whether a notice to vacate without a
late payment notification can result in the forfeiture of a security deposit); Love v. Monarch
Apartments, 771 P.2d 79, 82-83 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (awarding damages for the wrongful
withholding of a security deposit); Vogel v. Haynes, 730 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that failure to give notice of damages precludes the landlord from retaining the security
deposit); Asbury v. Mauk, 687 P.2d 31, 34 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing whether a security
deposit could be considered in garnishment proceedings).
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any sum of money specified in a rental agreement ... to be deposited
with a landlord by a tenant as a condition precedent to the occupancy of
a dwelling unit, which sum of money, or any part thereof, may be
forfeited by the tenant under the terms of the rental a reement upon the
occurrence or breach of conditions specified therein.
Under section 58-2550(a) of the KRLTA, a landlord may collect a
security deposit from the tenant prior to the tenant's move in.'' The
amount of the security deposit allowed by statute is no more than one
month's rent if the dwelling is unfurnished and no more than one and
one-half month's rent if the dwelling is furnished.' 2  If the rental
agreement allows the tenant to keep a pet, the landlord may charge an
additional security deposit of no more than half of one month's rent.'
3
In general, after the tenant has moved out, the landlord may apply
the security deposit to accrued rent and to any actual damages the tenant
has made to the rental property.' 4 A landlord may also retain the tenant's
security deposit if the tenant does not pay rent but instead applies any or
all of the security deposit toward the rent.' 5 In this instance, if the rental
agreement specifically provides for the forfeiture, a tenant who owes
back rent forfeits his security deposit, and the landlord is then entitled to
recover the rent due as if the deposit was never applied as such.'
6
As a practical matter, the landlord should conduct an inspection
immediately after the tenant vacates the rental property because a
balance, along with written itemization of costs and expenses assessed
against the security deposit, is due to the tenant within thirty days after
the tenant vacates.' 7 If the landlord fails to return the full or partial
balance of the security deposit (with itemization of proper deductions
taken from the deposit) within the thirty-day period, a civil penalty of
10. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2543(m) (2005).
11. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2550(a) (2005).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 58-2550(b). Other states follow this same practice. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
83.49(1)(a)-(b), (3)(a) (2004) (requiring a landlord to return a tenant's security deposit, with interest
earned, within fifteen days after the tenant vacates the rental property if the landlord does not have a
claim against the security deposit); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-18(c) (2003) (requiring the landlord to
provide the tenant with an itemized list of deductions to be levied against the security deposit within
thirty days of termination of the rental agreement).
15. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2550(d).
16. Id.; see also Clark v. Walker 590 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1979) (holding the rental agreement
must explicitly include the forfeiture provision in the lease: otherwise, the landlord is precluded from
retaining the tenant's security deposit as permitted under section 58-2550(d)).
17. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2550(b) (requiring a return of the deposit or an accounting of
any expenses within thirty days).
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one and one-half times the amount wrongfully withheld will be assessed
against the landlord.18 A tenant who has vacated the leased premises
may file a suit against the landlord to recover the security deposit after
the tenancy has ended if the tenant believes that the landlord failed to
properly return some or all of the deposit. Because the amount in
controversy typically does not exceed $4000, actions to recover the
security deposit are usually filed in small claims court.' 9
Since the KRLTA was enacted in 1975, there have been a number of
cases in which the Kansas appellate courts have addressed the various
rights and obligations of both landlords and tenants concerning the
security deposit. 20 In Wurtz v. Cedar Ridge Apartments, a case decided
in 2001, the Kansas Court of Appeals addressed whether the landlord
was entitled to enforce the language included within the security deposit
provision, which allowed the landlord to retain the tenant's security
deposit if she prematurely terminated her lease. 2  The landlord and
tenant in Wurtz entered into a year-long lease, from March 1, 1999 to
February 29, 2000, with the tenant paying rent of $395 per month.22 The
tenant, Sarah R. Wurtz, paid a security deposit of $200 prior to moving
in.23 The security deposit provision in the rental agreement provided for
a deposit "as security for the payment of all charges which may accrue
and for the full and faithful performance of all the covenants and
conditions of this Lease Agreement., 24 It further provided that Cedar
Ridge could retain the security deposit for accrued rent and damages as a
25result of Wurtz's premature termination of the rental agreement.
Independent of and in addition to the security deposit clause, the lease
contained a cancellation fee and forfeiture provision that required Wurtz,
"upon early termination of the lease, to give 30 days' written notice,
forfeit the security deposit, and pay a cancellation fee of $474.''26
On October 1, 1999, Wurtz sought in writing to cancel the lease
prematurely, claiming that the living conditions in the apartment were
18. See id. § 58-2550(c) (describing penalty imposed on a landlord for noncompliance with
subsection (b)); see also Love v. Monarch Apartments, 771 P.2d 79, 82-83 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding the assessment of the civil penalty upon the landlord is mandatory if the landlord
wrongfully withholds part or all of the tenant's security deposit).
19. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2703(a) (2005) (defining "small claim").
20. See supra note 9 (listing cases discussing the proper return of the tenant's security deposit
at the end of tenancy).
21. Wurtz v. Cedar Ridge Apartments, 18 P.3d 299, 301-02 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
22. Id. at 301.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 302.
25. Id. at 301.
26. Id.
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unacceptable.27 Wurtz's letter also requested return of the $200 security
deposit and waiver of the $474 cancellation fee. 28  Cedar Ridge
immediately provided a written response to Wurtz on October 4, 1999,
invoking the language of the lease.29  Specifically, Cedar Ridge
countered that, per the lease, Wurtz must provide a written thirty-day
notice to terminate the lease, forfeit the security deposit, and pay the
$474 cancellation fee. 30 On October 29, 1999, Wurtz completed a notice
to move form asserting that she had bought a house.3' She moved out of
the apartment and paid prorated rent in the amount of $356 for the month
of November. 32 Thereafter, Cedar Ridge conducted an inspection on
November 9, 1999, and assessed the following costs to Wurtz on its
inspection sheet: a $474 cancellation fee and $104 in cleaning and
miscellaneous expenses. 33  Cedar Ridge also indicated that Wurtz
forfeited the security deposit of $200 because she prematurely terminated
the lease.34 They deducted $106 for overpayment of November rent,
35
calculating a total of $472 owed by Wurtz.
36
Wurtz refused to pay Cedar Ridge the $472 it claimed she owed.3 7
After failed attempts at negotiating with Cedar Ridge, Wurtz filed a
small claims action requesting that the court order the return of her
security deposit and make a finding that the $474 cancellation fee was
grossly unfair.38 Cedar Ridge filed a counterclaim seeking the $472 they
originally demanded from Wurtz.39 The small claims court denied both
parties' claims.40
On Wurtz's de novo appeal to the district court, the judge determined
that the language in the clause allowing Cedar Ridge to retain the
security deposit due to Wurtz's failure to perform her obligations under
the lease was a liquidated damages clause and therefore precluded under

















Ridge the cost to clean the apartment-$104 assessed as actual
damages-and gave Wurtz credit for the overpayment of November rent
($106).42 Thus, the district court determined that Cedar Ridge
wrongfully withheld $202. The court then assessed a civil penalty of one
and one-half the amount wrongfully withheld ($202) to determine that
Wurtz was entitled to $303, plus the $202 wrongfully withheld, for a
total of $505.43
Probably equally significant in Wurtz was the district court's refusal
to consider whether the small claims court correctly denied Cedar
Ridge's request for enforcement of the cancellation fee, which would
have allowed Cedar Ridge to recover $474 from Wurtz. The district
court ruled that Cedar Ridge had failed to preserve the issue for appeal. 4
Cedar Ridge, dissatisfied with the district court's ruling, appealed the
judgment to the Kansas Court of Appeals, wherein, once again, one of
the issues addressed was the enforceability of the security deposit
provision that entitled Cedar Ridge to retain Wurtz's security deposit due
to her failure to fulfill the terms of the lease.45 The Wurtz court
referenced a 1986 Kansas case, Vogel v. Haynes, in which the Court of
Appeals in that instance reviewed a particular security deposit provision
in a residential lease to determine whether the language included
liquidated damages.46 The security deposit clause in Vogel was similar
to the one contained in Wurtz's lease. It provided that a "deposit [is
required] . . . as security to the Lessor for the performance of this
Agreement." The clause further stated:
The deposit shall be returned if in the Lessor's (Owner's) opinion all of
the Lessee's (Renter's) obligations in this Agreement have been
fulfilled on the termination of this Agreement and the Lessee (Renter)
has remained for a minimum of one (1) year from the date that Lessee
(Renter) paid the first full month rent under this Agreement.
47
The rental agreement between the tenant, Rhoda Vogel, and the
landlord, William G. Haynes, was structured as a month-to-month
tenancy allowing either the landlord or tenant to terminate the tenancy by
providing written thirty-day notice.48 Vogel resided in the apartment for
42. Id.
43. Id. at 302.
44. Id. at 304.
45. Id. at 300-01.
46. Id. at 302 (citing Vogel v. Haynes, 730 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986)).
47. Id. (quoting Vogel, 730 P.2d at 1097).
48. Vogel, 730 P.2d at 1096.
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approximately six months before terminating the tenancy in writing.49
Consequently, she did not comply with the security deposit provision,
which required her to live in the leased premises for at least one year,
and ostensibly forfeited the security deposit she paid to the landlord. ° In
Vogel, the court determined that the provision requiring return of the
security deposit if Vogel failed to live in the rental property for a year
was a liquidated damages provision that could not be included in the
security deposit clause.51 The court further reasoned that the landlord
was precluded from assessing a lump sum penalty against Vogel because
"K.S.A. 58-2550(b) provides that the landlord may only deduct for actual
52damages sustained" and nothing more.
Using Vogel as guidance, the Wurtz court reasoned that, under
section 58-2550(b), the security deposit covers actual damages, and the
landlord must itemize such damages in the form of a written notice to the
tenant.5 3 Furthermore, the court stressed, liquidated damages are by their
very nature not itemized.5 4 Thus, the court determined, the statute must
be interpreted to permit only actual, but not liquidated, damages.
55
Relying on Vogel's interpretation of section 58-2550(b), the Wurtz court
held "the district court correctly refused to award Cedar Ridge the entire
security deposit as liquidated damages, but correctly deducted the $104
in [actual] damages from the deposit."
5 6
As to the civil penalty assessed against Cedar Ridge, the appeals
court found that the district court erred in its calculation, noting that the
rent overpayment amount of $106 should not have been considered in its
calculation.5 7 Rather, the court noted, the civil penalty should have been
calculated in the following manner: $200 (security deposit) minus $104
(actual damages), for a total of $96, as this is the amount Cedar Ridge
wrongfully withheld. Thus, $96 (the amount wrongfully withheld)
multiplied by the civil penalty of one and one-half equals $144, totaling
$240 owed to Wurtz.
58
In summary, Kansas case law interpreting section 58-2550(b)
establishes that, when withholding all or part of a tenant's security
49. Id. at 1097.
50. Id.
5I. Id. at 1098.
52. Id.
53. Wurtz v. Cedar Ridge Apartments, 18 P.3d 299, 302 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. See also infra Part lI.B. for further discussion of liquidated-damage clauses in leases.
57. Wurtz, 18 P.3d at 303.
58. Id. at 303-04.
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deposit, a landlord shall be entitled to retain only actual damages
suffered, such as accrued rent and damages to the leased premises. A
landlord is required to provide the tenant with written itemization of all
damages deducted from the security deposit. If the landlord withholds
any or all of a tenant's security deposit for any reason other than what the
statute allows, the landlord shall be assessed the civil penalty provided in
section 58-2550(c).
B. Cancellation Fee Provisions. The Questionable Legality in
Residential Leases
Probably the most curious issue in Wurtz, which the Kansas Court of
Appeals did not address, was the legality of the cancellation fee that was
included in the parties' rental agreement. 59  The cancellation fee clause
was separate from the security deposit provision and entitled Cedar
Ridge to $474 for Wurtz's premature termination of the lease. 60  A
cancellation fee is a type of liquidated damages if it stipulates an amount,
agreed upon by the parties, to be paid in the event of breach. 6' The
legality of a cancellation fee clause in a residential lease would have
been a matter of first impression, but the Court of Appeals noted that,
because Cedar Ridge failed to cross-appeal at the district court level, the
question of its enforceability was not properly preserved for appeal.62
59. See id. at 303 ("Cedar Ridge failed to preserve for appeal the issue of cancellation fee
provisions in the lease agreement.").
60. Id. at 301.
61. See Kvassay v. Murray, 808 P.2d 896, 900-01 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (analyzing a
liquidated-damage clause in a manufacturing contract); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 315, Thomas County
v. DeWerff, 626 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (noting "[a] stipulation for damages upon a
future breach of contract is valid as a liquidated damages clause if the set amount is determined to be
reasonable and the amount of damages is difficult to ascertain"); SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A.
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 65:1 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the validity of
liquidated-damage clauses in contracts); Gregory Scott Crespi, Measuring "'Actual Harm "for the
Purpose of Determining the Enforceability of Liquidated Damages Clauses, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1579,
1579-80 (2005) (noting "[a] contractual provision stipulating a sum of money to be paid as damages
in the event of breach will be enforced as a valid liquidated damages clause in most U.S.
jurisdictions" subject to certain requirements); Henry F. Luepke Ill, How to Draft and Enforce a
Liquidated Damages Clause, 61 J. MO. B. 324, 324 (2005) ("Parties to contract are free to stipulate
to an amount certain that, in the event of breach, the non-breaching party shall recover in lieu of
actual damages."); Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damage Clause: A
Practical Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 33 (2001) ("A liquidated
damage clause ... quantifies and assigns risk associated with a default by any party to a contract.").
See also infra text accompanying notes 65-87 for a discussion of the tests Kansas courts employ to
distinguish allowable liquidated-damage clauses from illegal penalty provisions.
62. Wurtz, 18 P.3d at 304. An appeal from small claims court "shall be tried and determined de
novo before a district judge." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2709(a) (2005). Though Cedar Ridge failed to
cross-appeal the small claims judgment that denied enforcement of the lease's cancellation fee, at
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Though the court in Wurtz clearly stated that liquidated damages or a
lump sum penalty are not permissible within the security deposit
provision of the KRLTA,63 the question still remains as to whether a
cancellation fee, separate from a security deposit clause, may be
enforceable under the Act.
While the court in Wurtz did not address the legality of a separate
liquidated damages clause, cancellation fee provisions continue to be
included in residential leases despite some question as to their
enforceability. A review of relevant Kansas statutes and case law reveals
arguments for and against enforcing such liquidated damages clauses in
residential leases, but unfortunately provides no clear answer as to
whether they will withstand judicial scrutiny.
One argument for enforcing a cancellation fee is that, because the
lease is a contract, Kansas law permits inclusion of such provisions as
long as the cancellation fee is structured as liquidated damages and not as
an illegal penalty. 64 This argument requires a further look at the nature
of Kansas contract law, specifically at how the courts characterize
liquidated damages and penalty clauses. In two particular Kansas cases,
the Court of Appeals has provided comprehensive overview of the
distinction between liquidated damages clauses and penalties in other
contractual contexts.
In the first case, Unified School District No. 315 v. DeWerff,65 the
appellate court addressed whether a clause included in a teacher's
employment contract was a valid liquidated damages clause or an illegal
penalty.66 Granted, DeWerif dealt with interpretation of an employment
contract and not a residential lease, but the court provided a detailed
discussion of the nuances of liquidated damages and penalty clauses
generally. 67 Much can be gleaned from the DeWerffopinion that may be
extended by analogy to the landlord-tenant context.6 8
oral argument it contended it was not required to do so under section 61-2709(a). Wurtz, 18 P.3d at
304. This procedural issue was a matter of first impression for the court. The court held that,
because the district judge sits as an "appellate court" in instances where there is a direct appeal from
a small claims judgment, the proceeding is "predominantly appellate in nature." Id. Therefore,
Cedar Ridge should have formally appealed the issue of enforceability of the cancellation fee.
63. Id. at 302 (citing Vogel v. Haynes, 730 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986)).
64. See supra note 61 (discussing the validity of liquidated-damage clauses in contracts).
65. 626 P.2d 1206 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
66. Id. at 1207.
67. Id. at 1208-10.
68. Cf John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1570, 1572 (D. Kan. 1986)
(addressing the issue of "unconscionability" in a contract for the sale of goods). In discussing
Kansas law regarding the doctrine of unconscionability, the Blubaugh court cites illustrative Kansas
cases and states that the doctrine of unconscionability under the U.C.C. has been "extended by
analogy to other areas of law." Id.
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In DeWerff, a local school district in Kansas sought to enforce a
contractual provision against a teacher (and basketball coach) who
resigned after the contract was signed, but before the school year
began.69 The clause at issue provided that:
in all cases where a teacher who is under contract fails to honor the full
term of his or her contract, a lump sum of $400.00 be collected between
contract acceptance and August 1 if contract is broken. After August 1
a penalty of $75.00 will be charged for each full or part of a month
remaining on his or her contract.
7
When the teacher, DeWerff, resigned before the school year began, the
school district invoked the language of the employment contract,
demanding that he pay the $400.7 1 DeWerff refused to pay, resulting in
the school district filing a suit to enforce the contract. 72 The district court
ruled in favor of the school district, finding the contractual provision to
be a valid liquidated damages clause and determining that the $400
amount was reasonable.
7 3
On appeal, DeWerff argued that the clause was unenforceable
because it was an illegal "penalty." 74  In determining whether the
contract provision was enforceable, the Kansas Court of Appeals began
its analysis by stating:
It is well settled that parties to a contract may stipulate to the amount of
damages for breach of the contract, if the stipulation is determined to be
a liquidated damages clause rather than a penalty. A stipulation for
damages upon a future breach of contract is valid as a liquidated
damages clause if the set amount is determined to be reasonable and
the amount of damages is difficult to ascertain.
75
Moreover, the court noted, the difference between a liquidated damages
clause and a penalty is that "a penalty is to secure performance, while a
69. See DeWerlf, 626 P.2d at 1207 (stating that the defendant, after being employed by the
school district for many years, gave notice of his resignation on June 28, 1978).
70. Id. at 1208 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 1207.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1208.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing White Lakes Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 490 P.2d
609, 613-15 (Kan. 1971); Beck v. Megli, 114 P.2d 305 (Kan. 1941); R.R. Co. v. Gaba, 97 P. 435,
436-37 (Kan. 1908)) (emphasis added). In DeWerff, the court of appeals noted that the teacher did
not challenge the district court's ruling that the amount of agreed upon damages ($400) was
reasonable and not excessive. DeWerff, 626 P.2d at 1210.
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liquidated damages provision is for payment of a sum in lieu of
performance.,
76
The court rejected DeWerffs argument that the contract clause's
reference to the $400 amount as a "penalty" was determinative. It held
that use of the term "penalty" throughout the contract was insufficient to
defeat the district court's finding that the clause was a liquidated
damages clause.77 Instead, in determining whether to treat a contractual
provision as liquidated damages or a penalty, a court must look at the
facts before it and the underlying nature of the parties' transaction. 78 A
contract clause will be deemed "a penalty where there is no attempt to
calculate the amount of actual damages that might be sustained in case of
breach. 79
The other Kansas case assessing the validity and enforceability of
liquidated damages, Kvassay v. Murray, arose in the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) context.8 ' It involved the sale of baklava
between two merchants. 82  In assessing whether the seller of baklava
would be allowed to enforce a liquidated damages clause that entitled it
to collect damages of five dollars per case of baklava if the buyer
"refuses to accept or repudiates the goods sold," the Kansas Court of
Appeals applied only a reasonableness test.8 3 The court stated that under
the U.C.C., codified at chapter 84 of the Kansas Statutes, it was not
necessary to apply the two-part test (reasonableness and difficulty in
ascertaining damages) articulated under DeWerff84  Instead, the court
focused on three criteria provided within the U.C.C. to measure
reasonableness. 85 The three criteria are: "(1) anticipated or actual harm
76. Id. at 1208 (citing Erickson v. O'Leary, 273 P. 414, 414-15 (Kan. 1929)); see also Gregory
v. Nelson, 78 P.2d 889, 892-93 (Kan. 1938) (finding a contract provision, which declared an
advance payment could be kept by a vendor if the vendee defaulted, was a liquidated-damage clause
and enforceable); Kuter v. Bank, 152 P. 662, 664 (Kan. 1915) (finding a contract provision, which
fixed the measure of damages at a certain amount and required both parties to deposit that amount
for a bank to hold until the terms are satisfied, was security for enforcement of the contract and not a
penalty).
77. DeWerff, 626 P.2d at 1208. But see the dissent, which disagreed with other members of the
court about the use of the term "penalty." Id. at 1211 (Abbott, J., dissenting). The dissent stressed
the purpose and intent of the parties, which was to impose a penalty for the breach of the
employment contract. This intent was clearly articulated in the contract; therefore, the use of the
term "penalty" within the contract cannot be discounted. Id.
78. Id. at 1208 (majority opinion).
79. Id. at 1209 (citing Gregory, 78 P.2d at 892).
80. 808 P.2d 896 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
81. Id. at 900.
82. Id. at 899.
83. Id. at900-01.
84. Id. at 900.
85. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-718 (1996)).
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caused by breach; (2) difficulty of proving loss; and (3) difficulty of
obtaining an adequate remedy. 86 After reviewing the reasonableness
test, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine
reasonableness in light of the three criteria.
87
Though the Court of Appeals sets out separate tests in DeWerff and
Kvassay to determine whether liquidated damages are allowable within
their respective contexts, in effect, the tests are nearly identical when
translated into the landlord-tenant context. Both cases appear to simply
suggest that, if a cancellation fee provision in a residential lease includes
an agreed upon amount that is reasonable and if the landlord can
demonstrate that, as a result of the tenant's breach, the amount of
damages is difficult to determine, then the cancellation fee provision will
be considered an enforceable liquidated damages clause. Whether a
court employs the DeWerff two-part test or the Kvassay reasonableness
test should make no practical difference in assessing the validity of a
liquidated damages clause in a lease as long as the court considers the
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the lease agreement. Thus,
there is no bright-line test for resolving whether cancellation fee clauses
are enforceable. Instead, the courts must make a determination as to
their enforceability on a case by case basis. Indeed, DeWerff and
Kvassay also demonstrate that the distinction between a valid liquidated
damages provision, which is enforceable under Kansas contract law, and
a penalty provision, which is void as illegal, may be difficult to make.
Another argument for enforcing cancellation fee provisions in
residential leases is that they are not expressly prohibited by the KRLTA.
Section 58-2545(a) states that parties to a residential lease agreement
may include "terms and conditions not prohibited" by the Act or other
rule of law. 88 Section 58-2547 lists four provisions that a landlord and
tenant may not agree to in a residential lease.89 Specifically, the statute
prohibits: (1) an agreement to waive or forego rights or remedies under
the KRLTA; (2) an automatic confession of judgment provision; (3) a
payment of attorney's fees clause; and (4) an exculpation or limitation of
liability provision.90 The landlord's inclusion of any of these provisions
in a lease may entitle the tenant to recover actual damages. 91  A
cancellation fee clause is not included in the list of prohibited terms, and
86. Id.
87. Id. at 901.
88. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2545(a) (2005).
89. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2547 (2005).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 58-2547(b).
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so may arguably be permitted under the Act as long as the agreed upon
amount is reasonable and is not deemed unconscionable as a matter of
law under section 58-2544.92
A third argument that may support enforcement of liquidated
damages clauses is weaker than the first two arguments. The Vogel court
intimates that a cancellation fee in a residential lease may be permissible
and enforceable so long as it is separate from the security deposit
provision. In Vogel, the landlord unsuccessfully argued that the lease
provision allowing him to keep the tenant's $110 deposit because of the
tenant's failure to remain in the apartment for a full year was a liquidated
damages clause, not a security deposit provision governed by section 58-
2550(b). 9 4 Referring to the specific language of that lease provision, the
Vogel court rejected the landlord's argument, stating "[w]e find no
language common to liquidated damage clauses," and enforced the
provision as a security deposit clause. 95  The court's comment
concerning the absence of specific liquidated damages language in the
lease is a subtle suggestion that, should the landlord have included a
separate clause structured as a liquidated damages clause, it may have
been enforceable. Moreover, in Vogel, the landlord sought to retain the
tenant's security deposit because of the tenant's breach. A liquidated
damages clause structured to allow the landlord to collect, rather than
keep, a reasonable amount of money for the tenant's breach might be
permissible.
Lastly, Kansas courts have determined that a late fee, charged to a
tenant for failure to pay rent when due, is permissible under the Act.
96
Yet, the KRLTA does not explicitly permit the landlord to assess such
damages to the tenant. Like a cancellation fee, a late fee is a form of
liquidated damages because it is an agreed upon amount between the
parties that the tenant must pay in the event the tenant breaches-that is,
does not pay rent in a timely fashion. Kansas courts have determined
92. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2544(a) (2005) (stating a court may refuse to enforce an
unconscionable lease term or the entirety of a lease containing an unconscionable lease provision);
see also Heckard v. Martin, 958 P.2d 665, 668 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (finding charges for late rent
payments recoverable unless they are unconscionable); infra text accompanying notes 100-03
(discussing unconscionability under Kansas law). For a discussion of the application of the doctrine
of unconscionability to various contracts, see Wille v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 549 P.2d
903, 903-11 (Kan. 1976).
93. See Vogel v. Haynes, 730 P.2d 1096, 1098-99 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a
landlord could not withhold a security deposit from an early vacating tenant because the landlord did
not provide an itemized list of damages to the tenant).
94. Id. at 1098.
95. Id.
96. E.g., Clark v. Walker, 590 P.2d 1043, 1051 (Kan. 1979); Heckard, 958 P.2d at 668.
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that as long as the late fee is reasonable, it may be included in a
residential lease and enforced. 97  Though a landlord is permitted to
collect a late fee from the tenant, it is possible the courts view a late fee,
which have not exceeded ten dollars in cases where courts have reviewed
them, as negligible and not as liquidated damages.
If late fees are permissible and enforced under the KRLTA, then why
wouldn't a cancellation fee be enforceable if a tenant prematurely
terminates the lease? The answer may be that inclusion of liquidated
damages such as a cancellation fee, in addition to a landlord's right to
collect a late fee, goes well beyond the boundaries of reasonableness. At
some point the landlord's stacking or inclusion of liquidated damages
clauses for every conceivable tenant breach becomes apparently one-
sided and punitive. Arguably, these clauses would be unenforceable
because, in combination and in total, they rise to the level of
unconscionability and are deemed void as a penalty.
The arguments against enforcement of liquidated damages clauses in
residential leases appear as convincing as those arguments in favor of
enforcement. One argument against enforcement of liquidated damages
clauses is that a cancellation fee clause may be unconscionable under
section 58-2544 of the KRLTA. Under this statutory provision, a court
may as a matter of law refuse to enforce an unconscionable term or, in its
discretion, refuse to enforce the entire lease if an unconscionable term or
terms exist in the residential lease.98 The statute further provides that if
either party or the court on its own motion raises the issue of
unconscionability, the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to present
evidence so the court can make its determination.
99
Unconscionability, like reasonableness, is not formally defined under
the KRLTA, but Kansas courts have explored the common law doctrine
of unconscionability in many contractual contexts. 00 Along with being
codified in the KRLTA, the doctrine of unconscionability is mentioned
in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (section 16a-5-108 of the Kansas
Statutes) and the Consumer Protection Act (section 50-627 of the Kansas
Statutes). 10 1 What constitutes unconscionability often depends on the
totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the contractual
97. Heckard, 958 P.2d at 668.
98. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2544 (2005).
99. Id.
100. See Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906 (Kan. 1976) (discussing application of
the doctrine of unconscionability to various contracts).
101. Id.
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agreement between the parties.'0 2  In the landlord-tenant context,
examples of relevant factors that a court may consider in determining
unconscionability might include: (1) boilerplate language that the
landlord, who may be in a stronger economic position than the tenant,
incorporates into a lease; (2) a significant or excessive fee for the
tenant's breach of the lease; (3) inclusion of clauses that are clearly
penalties or punitive in nature; (4) the circumstances leading up to the
execution of the lease; (5) the hiding of unfair or disadvantageous
clauses within the lease that adversely affect the tenant; (6) the use of
incomprehensible language within the lease; (7) the overall imbalance of
the rights and obligations of each party to the lease; and (8) the lease's
exploitation of the undereducated, illiterate, or unsophisticated tenant.
0 3
It may be the case under this analytical approach that no per se rule
against prohibiting enforcement of cancellation fee clauses exists.
Rather, the enforceability of cancellation fee clauses must be determined
case by case.
A second argument against enforcement of cancellation fee clauses is
the converse of an argument supporting the enforcement of cancellation
fee clauses. As already mentioned, the KRLTA lays out the basic
parameters of the landlord-tenant relationship and does not explicitly
mention liquidated damages clauses. The Act's silence on liquidated
damages might suggest that a cancellation fee provision or other
liquidated damages clause, which allows the landlord to collect rather
than retain money for actual damages from a tenant for conditions
beyond what the Act explicitly provides, may not be allowable, although
the Act does permit the landlord and tenant to include other terms and
conditions not prohibited by the KRLTA or other rule of law. Indeed, it
may be that courts draw a distinction between allowing a landlord to
include lease terms which allow the landlord to retain money paid by the
tenant for a security deposit and allowing a landlord to collect damages
for a tenant breach.
The statutory framework of the KRLTA itself further supports this
argument, specifically subsections (b) and (d) of section 58-2550, both of
which detail the treatment of the security deposit at the end of the
102. Id.
103. See id. at 906-07 (discussing unconscionability generally). In another case, the lessor of a
combine filed suit in federal court to recover damages from a lessee arising from the repossession
and sale of a combine. The federal district court held that the liquidated-damage clause included in
the lease, and entitling the lessor to collect $12,054.43 from the lessee as a deficiency from the resale
of the combine, was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. John Deere Leasing Co. v.
Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1570-75 (D. Kan. 1986).
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tenancy.10 4 The language of section 58-2550(b) expressly provides that
the landlord may only deduct damages and accrued rent from the security
deposit. 105 The Kansas Court of Appeals has interpreted this statutory
provision to permit the landlord to apply part or all of a security deposit
to accrued rent and actual damages. 106 Moreover, the court has also held
that any other conditions placed on return of the security deposit which
entitle the landlord to retain any or all of the security deposit as a result
of the tenant's breach are liquidated damages clauses and not permissible
under the security deposit provisions of the Act. 10 7  The language of
section 58-2550(d) is similarly restrictive. It allows for forfeiture of the
tenant's security deposit if the tenant attempts to apply the security
deposit to rent at any time during the tenancy, so long as the lease clearly
includes this forfeiture language.10 8 When interpreting the subsections in
light of each other, there is strong indication that the Act only allows
forfeitures of this specific type. Therefore, it is conceivable that
allowing the landlord to collect damages of any other kind or for any
other tenant breach is not permissible because it is not explicitly
provided for under the Act.'
09
A final argument against enforcing liquidated damages clauses,.such
as cancellation fee provisions, against tenants rests squarely on section
58-2565, which requires the landlord to "make reasonable efforts to rent
[the leased premises] at a fair rental" if the "tenant abandons the dwelling
unit." 110 In a situation where the tenant has abandoned or voluntarily
surrendered the rental property prior to expiration of the lease agreement,
the statute requires the landlord to mitigate any damages as result of the
tenant's premature termination of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Therefore, the landlord's immediate enforcement of the cancellation fee
against the tenant obviates the statutory mandate that the landlord
mitigate damages. As such, the tenant who finds himself in the
104. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2550(b), (d) (2005).
105. Id. § 58-2550(b).
106. See Vogel v. Haynes, 730 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2550(d); see also Clark v. Walker, 590 P.2d 1043, 1050 (Kan. 1979)
(stressing that the lease must include clear forfeiture language in order for the landlord to treat the
security deposit as forfeited under section 58-2550(d)).
109. Though the Kansas courts have created an exception with regard to late fees, it is arguable
that the late fee, in most cases not exceeding ten dollars, is negligible and is not viewed as liquidated
damages.
110. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2565 (2005). Subsection (b) of section 58-2565 allows the landlord
to enter the dwelling at times reasonably necessary if the tenant is absent from the unit in excess of
thirty days. Also, this subsection provides that if the tenant is ten days in default for nonpayment of
rent and has taken a substantial portion of his belongings, the landlord may treat the dwelling as
abandoned. Id.
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unfortunate position of being assessed a reasonable cancellation fee for
premature termination of a lease may successfully argue that the landlord
must prove his reasonable efforts to lease the rental property before a
cancellation fee can be assessed.
Thus, it remains unresolved whether liquidated damages clauses,
such as cancellation fee provisions found in residential leases, are
enforceable. Arguably, liquidated damages may be permissible in a
residential lease, provided they are not unconscionable and do not relate
to the tenant's security deposit. Indeed, whether a cancellation fee or
other lump sum payment clause included in residential leases is
enforceable in court may rest on whether the amount provided in the
liquidated damages clause is reasonable and does not rise to the level of
unconscionability. It may also depend largely on the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding the lease agreement and on whether the
courts will draw a distinction between a landlord's proper withholding of
a security deposit and the landlord's right to collect reasonable damages
for a tenant's breach.
C. Landlord's Substantial Compliance in Return of the Tenant's
Security Deposit: A Rare Defense to Civil Penalties
A few years after Wurtz, the Kansas Court of Appeals again dealt
with a landlord's wrongful withholding of a tenant's security deposit,
this time in a different context. In A&S Rental Solutions, Inc. v. Kopet," "
the court addressed whether strict compliance is required in returning a
tenant's security deposit under section 58-2550(b) of the KRLTA." 2
The original tenants, George Lien and Julie McEnaney, who paid the
$900 security deposit at the beginning of their tenancy, subleased the
rental property to third parties, Terance and Jodie Kopet." 3  The
landlord, A&S, acquiesced to the sublease. Moreover, with the
agreement of Lien and McEnaney, A&S retained their original security
deposit of $900 in order to ensure the performance of the sublessees, the
Kopets. 1
4
At the end of the sublease, A&S sought to return the security deposit
to its rightful owner. Unsure whether the original lessees or the
sublessees were rightly entitled to the amount, A&S filed a petition for
I 1I. 76 P.3d 1057 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1058.
114. Id.
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declaratory judgment."l 5 A&S also sought back rent and damages from
the Kopets in its petition.' 16  By the time a hearing was held on the
landlord's petition, more than thirty days had lapsed since the Kopets
vacated the rental property.'17 The district court issued an order finding
the Kopets liable for unpaid rent and ordering the balance of the security
deposit, $215, to be paid to Lien and McEnaney, the original tenants." 18
Moreover, the district court determined that A&S wrongfully withheld
the security deposit from Lien and McEnaney and assessed a civil
penalty of one and one-half times the amount wrongfully withheld under
section 58-2550(c)." 9 In making its decision to assess the civil penalty
against A&S, the district court relied on Love v. Monarch,'12 a case
where the Kansas Court of Appeals held that a trial court shall assess a
civil penalty under section 58-2550(c) if the tenant is successful in
recovering part or all of the security deposit from the landlord.
121
The only issue reviewed on appeal was whether the district court
erred in assessing the civil penalty under section 58-2550(c). 122  The
Kansas Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in relying on
Love as authority for the assessment of a civil penalty on the landlord.
23
The court reasoned that, while Love provides that a trial court has no
discretion whether to assess the penalty when the landlord wrongfully
withholds a tenant's security deposit, the A&S case was distinguishable
because two different parties claimed ownership of the security
deposit. 24 More significantly, the court noted that the landlord's petition
for declaratory judgment sought determination of the rightful ownership
of the security deposit and demonstrated the landlord's earnest efforts to
comply with section 58-2550(b). 25 Ultimately, the court determined that
the landlord's affirmative and good faith efforts in filing the petition for
declaratory judgment equaled substantial compliance.' 26 Thus, the Court






120. 771 P.2d 70 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
121. A&S Rental Solutions, 76 P.3d at 1059 (citing Love, 771 P.2d at 81-83).
122. Id. at 1058.
123. Id. at 1059.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Though the court in A & S does not refer explicitly to the actions of the landlord as
"good faith" efforts, the KRLTA defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct of the
transaction concerned." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2543(d) (2005).
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of the statute, the trial court erred in assessing the civil penalty against
A&S. 
12 7
The result in A&S was probably appropriate considering the unique
facts of the case and the landlord's efforts to determine rightful
ownership of the security deposit and ensure its proper return. However,
it is important to note that, as a general matter, many states, including
Kansas, mandate that landlords strictly comply with their respective
statutes concerning proper return of a tenant's security deposit.
Otherwise, a landlord is precluded from retaining all or any portion of
the deposit. In some states, like Kansas, a landlord is assessed statutory
damages for wrongful withholding. 128 Moreover, the A&S court stressed
that its decision to set aside the trial court's assessment of the civil
penalty was based on the specific facts of the case and therefore did not
create a generally applicable substantial compliance exception to the
landlord's duty to comply with section 58-2550(b).12 9
D. Recovery of Late Fees in Residential Agreements
The KRLTA does not specifically mention or discuss the
enforceability of late fees in a residential lease, but the Kansas Supreme
Court had the opportunity to address them as early as 1979. In Clark v.
Walker, the tenants, wary the landlord would not return their security
deposit at the end of their tenancy, refused to pay their last month's rent
when it became due, insisting the landlord apply their $200 security
127. A&S Rental Solutions, 76 P.3d at 1060.
128. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2550(c) (2005). In Garcia v. Tharg, 895 P.2d 226 (N.M. 1995),
the landlord refused to refund the tenant's security deposit and failed to provide the tenant with an
accounting explaining why she withheld the security deposit. Id. at 227. The New Mexico Supreme
Court held that, because the landlord failed to comply with section 47-8-18(c) of the state's Uniform
Owner-Resident Relations Act, she forfeited her right to retain any portion of the security deposit
and was precluded from filing any suit for alleged damages under the Act. The court also ordered
the landlord to return the full security deposit to the tenant and to pay the tenant's attorney's fee. Id.
at 229; see also Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Fulfilling the Deterrent and Restitutionary Goals of the
Security Deposits Statute and Other Developments in Indiana Property Law, 35 IND. L. REV. 1501,
1503-18 (2002) (discussing whether the Indiana Security Deposits statute requires "strict
compliance" or whether it permits "substantial compliance" by the landlord); Residential
Landlord/Tenant Disputes: Parties' Rights, Obligations, and Remedies, Chapter VII, Security
Deposits and Advance Rent, 2006 FLA. B. FASTRAIN 31, 33 (noting that, under Florida law, the
landlord must strictly comply with the requirements of the security deposit statute or forfeit any
claim to the deposit).
129, A&S Rental Solutions, 76 P.3d at 1059-60. In A&S, the court explained that the purpose of
the civil penalty statute would not be served by imposing such a penalty because, in that case, the
landlord had not simply refused to return the security deposit; rather, the landlord withheld the
deposit only while a declaratory action determining to whom the deposit belonged was pending. Id.;
see also supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
deposit toward their monthly rent of $2 10.130 When the rent came due,
the tenants tendered a check for ten dollars, so the total monthly rent was
ostensibly paid.' 3' The landlord refused to apply the security deposit as
rent and also refused to accept the tenants' ten dollar check, claiming
that, per the lease, the tenants were precluded from applying the security
deposit toward their last month's rent.' 32 When the landlord filed suit to
recover unpaid rent and seek forfeiture of the tenants' security deposit,
one of the issues raised on appeal was whether the landlord could collect
a ten dollar late fee for the tenants' failure to pay rent in a timely
manner.133 The court determined that the tenants' attempt to apply the
security deposit toward the last month's rent and their tender of ten
dollars did not constitute payment of rent under the lease. 134 Therefore,
the court held, the district court should have enforced the late fee
provision against the tenants. 1
35
Almost twenty years after Clark, the Kansas Court of Appeals again
addressed whether the landlord could recover late fees under the KRLTA
in Heckard v. Martin.136 In Heckard, the otherwise uneventful two-year
relationship between the landlord, Robert W. Heckard, and the tenants,
Andrew and Stacy Martin, ended badly after the Martins withheld rent
because Heckard refused to make requested repairs to their leased
duplex.1 37 When the Martins refused to pay rent and provided a thirty-
day notice of their intent to terminate the lease, Heckard gave them a
three-day notice to pay rent or vacate.1 38 Soon thereafter, Heckard filed
an eviction proceeding against the Martins seeking back rent and
statutory damages pursuant to section 58-2570(c) of the KRLTA,
claiming the Martins were willful holdovers.'
1 39
130. Clark v. Walker, 590 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Kan. 1979).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1045-46.
133. Id. at 1051.
134. Id.
135. Id. The Clark court reversed and remanded the case with directions. Id. Other states have
similarly enforced late-fee provisions against tenants. See Krupp Realty Co. v. Joel, 309 S.E.2d 641,
644 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding a "$50 late charge should have been included in the trial court's
award of rent"); Nylen v. Park Doral Apartments, 535 N.E.2d 178, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) ("[T]he
trial court properly awarded late fees for the balance of the term."); Borne v. Wilander, 509 So. 2d
572, 573 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding imposition of late payment penalty); cf Highgate Assocs.,
Ltd. v. Merryfield, 597 A.2d 1280, 1284 (Vt. 1991) (holding that a five-dollar late fee imposed after
the sixth day of the month plus one dollar for each additional day the rent was late was not a valid
liquidated-damage provision but rather an unenforceable penalty).
136. 958 P.2d 665, 668 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
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On appeal, Heckard argued that he was entitled to collect late
charges pursuant to the lease, amounting to ten dollars, because the
Martins did not pay their rent in a timely manner. 140  Because the
KRLTA does not specifically allow for late fee provisions, the court
looked at whether late fees fit the statutory definition of recoverable
"rent". 141 Under section 58-2543(j), "rent" is defined as "all payments to
be made to the landlord under the rental agreement, other than the
security deposit." 142 The court determined that the definition of "rent"
allows the landlord to recover late fees in an eviction proceeding
provided that the late fee is not unconscionable under section 58-2544
and as long as the landlord specifically requests the late charges in the
eviction petition. 143  In Heckard, however, the landlord failed to
specifically request late fees in his eviction petition, and therefore was
not entitled to recover them.' 44 Thus, if a residential lease provides for a
late fee and the landlord wants to recover such fee in an eviction action,
the landlord must include the request in the petition. Otherwise, late fees
are not recoverable.
E. Definition of and Consequences Arising from Willful Holdover by
Tenant
In Heckard, the Kansas Court of Appeals also addressed whether the
tenants' refusal to pay rent while remaining in the duplex as holdovers
rose to the level of "willfulness" under section 58-2570(c), the Act's
holdover provision. 14  The statute provides that a landlord may recover
damages of not more than one and one-half months' rent or not more
than one and one-half times the actual damages sustained by the
landlord, whichever is greater, if the tenant's holdover is "willful and not
in good faith.' 46 The court affirmed the district court's finding that the
Martins' actions in remaining in the duplex were not "willful," noting
that the landlord failed to meet his statutory obligations under section 58-
2553, which required him to address the requested repairs that
"materially affected the safety of his tenants.' ' 147 The court stated that a
140. Id. at 668.
14 1. Id. Interestingly, in Heckard, the Kansas Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of late fees
and did not refer to the 1979 Kansas Supreme Court decision in Clark.
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2543(j) (2005).
143. Heckard, 958 P.2d at 668.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 667.
146. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2570(c) (2005).
147. Heckard, 958 P.2d at 667 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2553, -2570(c)).
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willful action is one "'with a designed purpose or intent on the part of a
person to do wrong or to cause an injury to another." 4 8 In this case, the
Martins' actions in refusing to pay rent but remain in the duplex were not
intended to harm the landlord, but were, instead, futile attempts to
encourage Heckard to make the requested and necessary repairs. 149
III. STATUTORY CHANGES: THE KRLTA AND THE EVICTION STATUTE
Since the KRLTA was codified in 1975, the statute has undergone a
few minor changes. In the last ten years or so, the only addition to the
Act has been section 58-2570(e), which was enacted in 2005. It
addresses the landlord's duty to include a notice requirement in any
document the landlord issues the tenant that may bind the tenant to terms
beyond the original lease agreement.' 50  A discussion of section 58-
2570(e), some notable Kansas legislative activity relating to other
proposed changes to the KRLTA, and a few legislative amendments
pertaining, and relevant to, the Eviction statute are discussed below.
A. The Addition of Section 58-2570(e) to the KRLTA and Proposed
Legislative Limitations on Automatic Lease Renewal Clauses
After mounting pressure from tenants and tenant's associations,
during the 2003 legislative session, the Kansas legislature added a new
provision, section 58-2570(e), to the KRLTA. This additional provision
deals with documents or notices the landlord provides to the tenant
which relate to a tenant's intent to vacate a rental property.151 The new
statutory language stems from a need to address the common practice
among landlords of providing tenants with a document to sign toward the
end of the tenancy, which ostensibly is a tenant's notice to the landlord
of his intent to vacate the rental property. However, these documents
usually include additional terms such as language that binds the tenant to
another lease term if the tenant does not sign the notice to vacate on or
before a prescribed time. Before the amendment, if the tenant did not
read the document carefully or did not fully comply with its terms, the
obvious consequence was that these terms unexpectedly bound him to
148. Id. at 667 (quoting KANSAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS KANSAS 3d 103-
05 (Thomson West 2005)).
149. Id. at 667-68.
150. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2570(e).
151. See id. (requiring a notice signed by landlord, tenant, or both with specific notice of the
changes to a lease).
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additional obligations beyond the original lease. The new amendment to
the KRLTA, section 58-2570(e), states that if the landlord provides a
document to the tenant that includes any additional language not
contained in the original lease agreement, then the document must
include the following language in no less than ten-point boldface type:
"YOUR SIGNATURE ON THIS DOCUMENT MAY BIND YOU TO
ADDITIONAL TERMS NOT IN YOUR ORIGINAL LEASE
AGREEMENT. IF YOUR LEASE REQUIRES YOU TO GIVE
WRITTEN NOTICE OF YOUR INTENT TO VACATE, YOU HAVE A
RIGHT TO DECLINE TO SIGN THIS DOCUMENT AND TO
PROVIDE WRITTEN NOTICE IN ANOTHER FORM."'
152
Being a fairly recent addition to the KRLTA, no Kansas cases have
addressed section 58-2570(e), nor are there any decisions from other
states that provide guidance in this area. Hopefully, the above proviso
printed in boldface type will catch the attention of the unsuspecting
tenant who ignores or otherwise fails to carefully read documents that a
landlord frequently issues to the tenant as the end of the tenancy nears.
A related problem is the automatic lease renewal clause, a provision
which a landlord includes in the original lease with the tenant. 153 This
type of clause states conditions that the tenant must meet prior to the
lease expiring, such as providing the landlord with a thirty-day notice of
the tenant's intent to vacate the leased premises. 5 4 In some leases, these
clauses require the tenant to notify the landlord of his intent to vacate
sixty or ninety days before the expiration of the original lease.' 55 The
tenant's failure to meet the notice obligation results in automatic renewal
of the lease for an additional period, or in the alternative, the tenant's
payment of specified liquidated damages to the landlord.
156
To date, no Kansas case addresses the legality of the automatic lease
renewal clause, but like cancellation fee clauses, the KRLTA does not
expressly provide for them.' 57 In 2006, a bill introduced to the Kansas
legislature sought to prohibit a landlord's ability to include automatic
152. Id.
153. See Sophia Maines, Automatic Lease Renewal Can Be Costly, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-
WORLD (Kan.), June 16, 2006, at Al ("Automatic renewals are either a blessing or a curse,
depending on what side of the fence people are on.").
154. See id (giving an example of a situation where a tenant had until a specific date to give
notice before vacating).
155. See id (noting that those opposed to automatic renewals wanted a law prohibiting such
renewals more than ninety days before the lease expired).
156. See id. (reporting a resident must pay $1600 to break a lease that was automatically
renewed when she failed to give notice of her intent to vacate).
157. See id. ("The law currently makes no direct mention of automatic renewals.")
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renewal clauses in residential leases. 158  Another alternative that was
lobbied to the legislature in 2006 was to require the landlord to issue a
written notice to the tenant as a reminder of his responsibility to notify
the landlord of his intent to vacate the rental property before the
automatic lease renewal took effect. 159 A version of the bill passed the
Kansas Senate, but failed in a House committee. 160  Since the KRLTA
remains silent on the enforceability of automatic renewal clauses, they
continue to be included in residential leases, but the question of their
legality remains unanswered
161
The nature of the automatic renewal clause appears to heavily favor
landlords. It triggers renewal of a lease when a tenant fails to notify the
landlord of his intent to vacate the rental property in the manner
prescribed in the lease, thus imposing a harsh consequence on the tenant
for what is probably, at most, an unintentional or negligent failure to
act. 62 Another obvious benefit to the landlord is that it keeps the tenant
on the hook for another lease period, thereby eliminating the hassle and
expense of finding a new tenant.163 The benefit to a tenant is that he, too,
does not have to deal with further lease negotiations with his landlord
and is guaranteed continued living arrangements without the
inconvenience or cost of searching for alternative housing.' 64  The
downside, of course, is that the tenant who does not comply with the
provisions of the automatic lease renewal clause may be unwittingly
committing himself to a continued, albeit unintended, relationship with
the landlord.
B. Changes to the Eviction Statute
In 2000, the Forcible Eviction and Detainer (FED) statute, formerly
located at sections 61-2301 to 61-2311 of the Kansas Statutes, was
repealed, recodified at sections 61-3801 through 61-3808, and renamed
158. S.B. 380, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2006).
159. Id. Kansas House Bill 2394 proposes this as well. H.B. 2394, 2007 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Kan.
2007).
160. Maines, supra note 153.
161. Id. The Lawrence Journal- World article highlights a similar problem in Urbana, Illinois.
The City of Urbana banned enforcement of automatic lease renewals within its city limits. Id. In the
current Kansas legislative session, efforts to address the automatic-renewal clause have been
introduced again in House Bill 2394, though no formal action on the bill has yet been taken. See
supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing House Bill 2394).
162. See Maines, supra note 153 (discussing problems tenants face with automatic renewals).
163. See id. (discussing the advantages of automatic renewals from the landlord's perspective).
164. Id.
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the "Eviction" statute. 165 The substance and procedure of the summary
proceeding was not altered much during the 2000 overhaul; however, in
2000 and beyond, the legislature has made amendments which are
worthy of discussion.' 
66
First, under the repealed FED statute, the landlord was required to
include a claim for rent whenever an FED action was filed based on the
tenant's failure to pay rent. 167  This is no longer the case under the
Eviction statute. Now, "if there is rent due for possession of the
premises, the petition may include a request for judgment for that amount
or the plaintiff may bring a subsequent lawsuit for that amount.' '168 This
change to the summary proceeding in state court is important because, as
will be discussed below, there are serious federal law implications on
evictions when the landlord includes a claim for back rent. In order to
avoid such implications in an eviction action, a landlord may forego
collection of back rent (at least initially) and, instead, seek only
immediate possession of the rental property.
The second major change, made in 2000, concerns the demand
notices that the landlord was required to provide the tenant before filing
an eviction action in nonpayment of rent situations. Unlike the FED
statute,169 the 2000 version of section 61-3803 did not explicitly allow
the landlord to combine the three-day demand notice under the Eviction
statute with the three-day demand notice under the KRLTA. 170  Due to
the omission of explicit language allowing for a combined three-day
notice under the Eviction statute, several decisions in the Douglas
County, Kansas, district court, in particular, required that the landlord
issue two separate three-day demand notices--one under the KRLTA,
demanding that the tenant pay rent within three days, and one under the
Eviction statute, demanding that the tenant vacate the leased premises
within three days.' 71 In 2002, the legislature clarified that the three-day
165. S.B. 504, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000).
166. For a comprehensive overview of the mechanics of the FED action, see Kirschbaum, supra
note 3.
167. Act of Apr. 23, 1969, ch. 290, § 61-2305, 1969 Kan. Sess. Laws 740, 762 (repealed 2000).
168. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-3804 (2005).
169. See infra note 172 (discussing the new FED's notice allowances).
170. Act of May 16, 2000, ch. 161, § 80, 2000 Kan. Sess. Laws 1386, 1421-22 (amended 2002).
171. Paul T. Davis, 2002 Legislative Wrap-Up, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Aug. 2002, at 15, 21 ("[The
bill amending section 61-3803] arose out of several Douglas County decisions that were requiring
two separate notices to be issued in eviction cases."). In Gunter v. Eiznhamer, 196 P.2d 177 (Kan.
1948), the Kansas Supreme Court interpreted the notice-to-quit requirement under the FED statute,
stating "three clear days must elapse between the date of serving the notice and the date the action is
commenced." Id. at 177 (emphasis omitted).
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demand notices under both statutes may be combined, explicitly stating
so in the Eviction statute." 2
Lastly, in 2000, the legislature made a relevant change to the small
claims procedure. The amendment limited a person to filing no more
than ten small claims in the same court during any calendar year.
Importantly, this limited the number of actions a landlord could file pro
se to collect back rent or actual damages from a tenant after the tenancy
ended. In 2006, the legislature amended the statute yet again increasing
the number of filings to twenty per year.'
73
IV. THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON EVICTIONS
A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:' 74 General Principles Relating
to Residential Evictions
In 1977, the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) was
enacted with the purpose of protecting consumers from deceptive,
abusive, and unfair collection practices of many third-party debt
collectors.175 In essence, the Act requires a debt collector to refrain from
engaging in threatening, rude, or obnoxious conduct in efforts to collect a
debt on behalf of a creditor.' 76  It also requires the debt collector to
provide the debtor with a written verification notice that contains the
following information: (1) the debt amount; (2) the creditor's name; (3) a
statement informing the debtor that there is a thirty-day period in which
to dispute the debt, otherwise the debt collector will assume that the debt
is valid; (4) a statement that the debtor has a right to verify the debt and
172. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-3803 (2005) ("The notice [of eviction] may be combined with
any notice provided for in [the KRLTA].").
173. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2704a(b) (Supp. 2006).
174. This brief discussion of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as it relates to state landlord-
tenant and eviction laws only highlights some relevant provisions of the Act and is in no way a
comprehensive overview. It is strongly recommended that the reader review the full text of the
FDCPA, which can be found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 to 1692p.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2000). For further discussion of the FDCPA, see generally Laura L.
Ice, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Attorneys Beware, J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Dec. 1995, at 32;
Bennett S. Silverberg, Advantage Tenant: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Gives Tenants
Oversized Rackets in the Eviction Match, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 227 (1999); Eric M. Steven, From
Landlord/Tenant to Debt Collector/Consumer and Back Again: Landlord/Tenant Notice Practice
and FDCPA Compliance After Romea, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 175 (1999/2000); Joshua P. Foster, Note,
The Application of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to Article 7 of the New York RPAPL, 74
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 451 (2000); Kara B. Schissler, Note, Come and Knock on Our Door: The Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act's Intrusion into New York's Summary Proceedings Law, 22 CARDOZO
L. REV. 315 (2000).
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (discussing the purpose of the FDCPA as "eliminat[ing] abusive
debt collection practices by debt collectors").
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the debt collector will supply proof of the debt, if the debtor makes such
a request in writing; and (5) the name and address of the original creditor
in instances where the current creditor is not the original creditor, if the
debtor requests the information in writing. 177 The Act also requires that
the debt collector include what is called a "mini-Miranda" warning in all
oral and written communications with the debtor.'7 8  This mandatory
disclosure provides, in relevant part, that the debt collector is "attempting
to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that
purpose.
'179
Though initially attorneys were exempt from the FDCPA, Congress
later repealed this exemption.' Confusion about the type of work (i.e.,
prelitigation collection efforts versus participation in pure litigation) and
conduct by lawyers that would implicate liability under the Act led to the
1995 U.S. Supreme Court case of Heintz v. Jenkins.'8 ' In Heintz, the
Supreme Court held that the FDCPA applied to lawyers "regularly
engaged" in the collection of consumer debt, even if those collection
efforts relate to litigation.' 82  Although Heintz clarified that attorneys
could be subject to the Act for representing clients in litigation matters,
there is still debate about what it means for a lawyer to be "regularly
engaged" in consumer debt collection.'83
The FDCPA obviously applies to attorneys who qualify as debt
collectors in efforts to secure payment of, for example, overdue medical
bills or dishonored checks on behalf of creditors.' 84 Indeed, whether the
Heinz rule applies to attorneys representing landlords in summary
proceedings, such as eviction actions, seems remote, even in instances
where the attorney, as a prerequisite to filing an eviction action for
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2000).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(l 1) (2000). See also Ice, supra note 175, at 34 (referring to the Act's
requirement as a "mini-Miranda" warning).
179. Id.
180. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (1986).
181. 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
182. Id.
183. See Silva v. Mid Atd. Mgmt. Corp., 277 F. Supp. 2d 460, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (holding a
law firm qualified as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA because the firm accepted at least ten
collection cases annually, even though the debt collection activity of the law firm amounted to only
one percent of the volume of the firm's cases).
184. See Goins v. JBC & Assocs., P.C., 352 F. Supp. 2d 262, 298 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding the
owner of a law firm was a "debt collector" because the owner collected outstanding debts on behalf
of his clients); see also Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting an attorney
was a debt collector based on a collection letter he sent to debtor). For further discussion of "debt
collectors" under the FDCPA, see Oldroyd v. Associates Consumer Discount Co., 863 F. Supp. 237,
241-42 (E.D. Pa. 1994), where the court held that a mortgage company was not a debt collector
under the FDCPA.
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nonpayment of rent, seeks to collect back rent by providing the tenant
with the statutory demand notice required by state law.185 Moreover, in
Kansas, it was generally the practice of attorneys representing landlords
in an eviction proceeding to rely exclusively on the language of the
residential lease and the laws of the state, namely the KRLTA and the
Eviction statute-as long as federal housing laws or tenant subsidies
were not involved. 186 However, in 1998, a federal court decision arising
out of a residential eviction case from the state of New York shocked
many state practitioners in Kansas and across the country, quickly
dispelling long held beliefs that an attorney's attempt to collect back rent
for the landlord, as part and parcel of an eviction proceeding, was solely
governed by state law.' 
87
In Romea v. Heiberger & Associates, a landlord in the state of New
York sought to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent. 188 Ironically, the
tenant, Jennifer Romea, did not dispute that she owed four months of
rent, totaling $2800.189 The landlord sought the legal expertise of a law
firm for assistance in collecting the past due rent from Romea and with
representation in an eviction action, if it became necessary. The law firm
made an attempt, in the form of a three-day demand notice as required by
New York state law, to collect the rent from Romea before filing the
eviction suit. 190 The three-day demand notice provided, in relevant part,
for the tenant to pay "the sum of $2,800.00 for rent of the premises. '' 19,
It also stated, "[y]ou are required to pay within three days from the day
of service of this notice, or give up possession of the premises to the
landlord." 192
Thereafter, Romea filed a class action lawsuit in federal court
alleging that the landlord's attorneys failed to comply with notice
requirements under the FDCPA.' 93 Specifically, Romea claimed that the
law firm's preparation and service of the three-day demand notice
185. See generally Kirschbaum, supra note 3, at 23-25 (discussing in depth the state law notice
requirement for evictions).
186. See Stephen Kirschbaum, Litigating When Federal Programs are Involved, J. KAN. B.
ASS'N, Sept 1996, at 32, 32-33 (discussing the implications of federal law and subsidies in state
eviction proceedings).
187. See Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) ( "Congress intended
to apply the exemption only to 'process servers,' and not to those who prepared the communication
that was served on the consumer.").
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violated section 1692g of the Act by failing to advise her that she had
thirty days to dispute the validity of the debt.' 94 The law firm's failure to
comply with the FDCPA, Romea argued, meant the firm was liable for
civil damages under the statute. 95
One of the pivotal issues in Romea was whether "back rent" was
considered a "debt" for purposes of the FDCPA. 196 Looking at the Act's
definition of "debt," the Second Circuit determined that "back rent" fell
within the definition. 197  "Debt" is defined under the Act as "an
obligation . . . to pay money arising out of a transaction" that involves
"personal, family, or household purposes."' 98 The court in Romea also
made another critical determination. It held that the three-day demand
notice, which the law firm drafted and delivered to the tenant pursuant to
New York state law, was a "communication" under the Act. 199 The
FDCPA's broad definition of "communication" is the "conveying of
information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through
any medium." 200 The effect of this determination is that the three-day
demand notice required under New York state law must yield to the
thirty-day notice provisions of the FDCPA if an attorney who is a debt
collector subject to the mandates of the Act issues the notice to the
tenant.20'
As a general proposition, the Romea decision may implicate an
attorney or law firm liability under the FDCPA for participation in
collecting back rent for a landlord or for representing a landlord in a
summary proceeding such as an eviction action filed in state court where
back rent is sought. How does Romea impact attorneys in Kansas who
represent landlords in collecting back rent in eviction actions where
nonpayment of rent is the basis for the suit? And does it matter if the
attorney does not engage in prelitigation efforts to collect back rent for
the landlord, but instead limits his participation to only representing the
landlord in the eviction action where back rent is sought?
194. Id.
195. Id. Since the law suit was filed as a class action, this meant the attorney or law firm could
be potentially liable for civil penalties under the statute that include actual damages suffered by each
tenant, attorney's fees, and an amount up to the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the net worth of
the attorney or law firm. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (2000).
196. Romea, 163 F.3d at 114.
197. Id. at 115-16.
198. Id. at 115 (internal quotations omitted).
199. Id. at 116.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2) (2000).
201. Romea, 163 F.3d at 116.
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First, it is important to note that Romea was a Second Circuit
decision and is not binding in Kansas. Also, to date, the Tenth Circuit
has not followed the Romea holding,20 2 and some jurisdictions have
either criticized it, distinguished it, or expressly rejected it.20 3 Second,
Romea only addressed the law firm's noncompliance under the FDCPA
with regard to its prelitigation efforts to collect back rent from the tenant
on behalf of the landlord. Romea did not address whether the attorney
(or law firm) who qualifies as a debt collector must comply with the
FDCPA if merely representing a landlord in an eviction action where the
landlord also seeks back rent. While Romea seems to be a lone standing
opinion or an aberration, attorneys representing landlords in collecting
back rent or in eviction actions where nonpayment of rent is the basis for
the suit should take precautions so as to avoid civil penalties for
noncompliance with the FDCPA. The civil penalties under the FDCPA
include actual damages suffered by the tenant, statutory damages of up to
$1000, and attorney's fees. 2 0 4 If a class action is filed, as was the case in
Romea, civil penalties include actual damages suffered by each tenant,
attorney's fees, and an amount up to the lesser of $500,000 or one
percent of the net worth of the debt collector.20 5
Kansas attorneys should also be wary of Romea considering the
similarities between New York and Kansas landlord-tenant law. Like
New York, Kansas requires the service of a three-day demand notice
upon a tenant as a prerequisite to filing an eviction action for
nonpayment of rent. Specifically, section 61-3803 of the Eviction statute
provides, "[b]efore a lawsuit to evict a person . . . is filed, the party
desiring to file such a lawsuit shall deliver to the other party a notice to
leave the premises for which possession is sought." 20 6 The notice shall
be delivered at least three days before commencing the lawsuit and this
notice can be combined with the three-day notice under the KRLTA.20 7
202. The only Tenth Circuit case on point is out of the District of Colorado, where the court held
an attorney representing a landlord in an eviction matter was not a "debt collector," and therefore not
subject to the FDCPA, because the attorney did not regularly collect debts. Cook v. Hamrick, 278 F.
Supp. 2d 1202, 1204-05 (D. Colo. 2003).
203. See Cook, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (addressing whether an attorney representing a landlord
is a debt collector and therefore subject to the FDCPA); Krevsky v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 85 F.
Supp. 2d 479, 481-82 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that checks are not debt under the FDCPA);
Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. v. Jones, 706 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302-03 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2000) (holding
FDCPA does not preempt "New York common law"); Missionary Sisters of Sacred Heart, Inc. v.
Dowling, 703 N.Y.S.2d 362, 369 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2000) (holding FDCPA did not preempt state
statute).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2000).
205. Id.
206. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-3803 (2005).
207. Id.
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The three-day demand notice under the KRLTA states that the "landlord
may terminate the rental agreement if rent is unpaid when due and the
tenant fails to pay rent within three days, after written notice by the
landlord of nonpayment and such landlord's intention to terminate the
rental agreement if the rent is not paid within such three-day period.,
20 8
In practice, if the tenant does not pay rent when it is due, the landlord
(or its attorney) can provide the tenant with a combined three-day notice
under the KRLTA and the Eviction statute, giving the tenant two options:
pay rent in full or vacate the leased premises within three days. 209 The
combined three-day demand notice must further state that the tenant's
failure to pay rent or vacate the rental property may result in legal
proceedings. In Kansas, a landlord's failure to provide this combined
three-day notice to the tenant prior to filing the eviction action means
that the court lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the merits of the eviction,
thus resulting in dismissal of the case.2 1 °
B. Strategies for Maintaining FDCPA Compliance
In light of Romea and the similarities between Kansas and New York
landlord-tenant and eviction law, it is possible a Kansas attorney may
have to defend against a tenant's claim of a FDCPA violation. The
strategies and considerations contained in the following subparts may
help the landlord and its attorney determine whether compliance with the
FDCPA is necessary and if so, how compliance can be achieved.
1. The Landlord Need Not Comply Because He Is Not a "Debt
Collector" Under the FDCPA
If the landlord seeks back rent from the tenant, the landlord himself
could deliver the combined three-day demand notice under the KRLTA
and the Eviction statute without complying with the FDCPA because a
creditor seeking to collect its own debt is not subject to the Act.2 1'
Should the tenant fail to pay rent or vacate the rental property as
requested in the three-day demand notice, then the attorney may file the
208. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2564(b) (2005).
209. Typically, most leases have a grace period ranging from three to five days in which a tenant
may pay the rent before the landlord issues the three-day demand notice, but the tenant is usually
assessed a late fee during this grace period.
210. Goodin v. King, 387 P.2d 206, 210 (Kan. 1963); Bell v. Dennis, 144 P.2d 938, 940 (Kan.
1944).
211. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2000) (stating that, to be a debt collector under the FDCPA, one
must be collecting debts "due another").
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eviction petition on behalf of the landlord, alleging nonpayment of rent
as the basis for the suit. Whether the attorney must comply with the
FDCPA when merely filing the eviction action in which back rent is also
sought may depend on, at least, two important considerations: (1)
whether the attorney is a debt collector under the Act; and (2) whether
the Act requires compliance for only filing the eviction action on behalf
of the landlord. Romea does not speak to the issue of whether an
attorney who is a debt collector must comply with the Act when filing an
eviction action seeking back rent, though Heintz hints that compliance
with the FDCPA in litigation matters is necessary if the attorney is a debt
collector attempting to collect a debt on behalf of a creditor even if the
collection of back rent is part and parcel of the eviction action.
2. The Attorney Who Is Not a "Debt Collector" Under the FDCPA
Need Not Comply
If the attorney is not a debt collector under the Act (or under Heintz),
then the attorney is not required to comply with the Act. This means that
in instances where the landlord seeks back rent from the tenant, the
attorney can prepare and deliver to the tenant the combined three-day
demand notice under Kansas law on behalf of the landlord without the
possibility of facing civil penalties under the FDCPA. It also means that
the attorney can file the eviction action and seek back rent from the
tenant without violating the Act.
As mentioned previously, the question about whether an attorney
qualifies as a debt collector is an ongoing debate. Though it may be
arguable that a specific attorney does not "regularly engage" in debt
collection so as to make him subject to the Act, it is possible that the
tenant could likely assert that the attorney is a debt collector under the
Act. In such case, the attorney must meet and defeat this challenge. As a
safeguard, an attorney who seeks to collect any debt on behalf of a
creditor should comply with the FDCPA, even in the eviction context,
where the attorney's representation in collecting back rent is secondary
to seeking lawful possession of the rental property on behalf of the
landlord.
3. Actions Constituting an Attorney's Full Compliance with the
FDCPA
Whether the landlord's attorney must comply with the FDCPA when
merely filing the eviction action on behalf of the landlord who is also
seeking back rent remains unclear because Romea hinged on the law
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firm's prelitigation efforts to collect back rent from the tenant. It seems
plausible that if the landlord seeks to collect its own debt by delivering a
three-day demand notice to the tenant and is unsuccessful, then
nonpayment of rent becomes the legal basis for the eviction action, and
the attorney should not be held liable under the Act for failing to comply
with its notice requirements. However, the eviction petition seeking
back rent from the tenant may be considered a "communication" under
the FDCPA's broad definition of the term; therefore, if the attorney is a
debt collector, he must comply with the notice requirements of the Act or
face civil penalties. Consequently, because the civil penalties for
violating the FDCPA are harsh and may be unavoidable, any attorney is
well-advised to comply with the FDCPA if he is representing a landlord
in an eviction matter seeking back rent.
Full compliance with the FDCPA creates at least two distinct options
for attorneys to follow when handling eviction actions where
nonpayment of rent is the basis for the suit. The practical effect of either
is that compliance with the FDCPA gives the tenant more time to remain
in the rental property without paying rent. That is, the landlord must
wait longer to gain lawful possession of his rental property without
receiving the tenant's monthly rent.
Under the first option, if the landlord issues the combined three-day
demand notice under Kansas law and the tenant does not comply with
terms of the notice, the attorney can file an eviction lawsuit seeking back
212rent. In the eviction petition, the attorney should include all of the
information required in the FDCPA verification notice. Then, the
attorney should allow thirty days for the tenant to answer the petition or
for the tenant's first appearance in the eviction action to be scheduled.213
The petition should also include the mini-Miranda disclosure. Once
thirty days have lapsed or all requirements of the FDCPA have been
fulfilled, the eviction action can proceed as provided in the Eviction
statute.
The second option considers the attorney's involvement as a debt
collector in issuing the combined three-day demand notice required
under state law. If the landlord enlists the attorney to issue the combined
three-day demand notice, the attorney should allow the tenant thirty,
rather than three, days to comply, thereby yielding to the notice
212. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text (discussing three-day demand notices).
213. Under section 61-3805 of the Kansas Statutes, once the eviction petition is filed, the court
shall determine when the first appearance shall be scheduled. The statute states that "[s]uch time
shall be not less than three nor more than 14 days after the date the summons is issued." KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 61-3805 (2005).
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requirements of the FDCPA.2 14 This means that the tenant will be given
a minimum of thirty days to pay rent or vacate the rental property before
the attorney files the eviction action seeking back rent. Once the eviction
petition is filed, the process for the summary proceeding follows the
timeline provided for in the Eviction statute.
4. Attorneys May Expedite the Eviction Action, but Not Seek Back
Rent, Without Full Compliance
Finally, the last consideration involves a scenario where the landlord
foregoes collection of back rent in the summary proceeding in order to
expedite the eviction process. Compliance with the FDCPA is a
potential issue only when a debt collector is seeking back rent from the
tenant on behalf of the landlord. Thus, to safely avoid implication of the
FDCPA altogether, when nonpayment of rent is the basis for the tenant's
breach of the landlord-tenant agreement, the landlord himself should
issue the combined three-day demand notice to the tenant. If the tenant
fails to comply with the demand notice, the attorney can then file the
eviction action using nonpayment of rent as the basis for the suit but not
include the landlord's request for back rent. Then, payment of back rent
will not necessarily be an issue for the court to consider in the eviction
proceeding, 21 5  and compliance with the FDCPA is not required.
Omission of a request for back rent in the eviction action permits the
attorney to bypass the FDCPA and allows the landlord to gain immediate
possession of the rental property under the state's eviction proceeding. If
the landlord employs such a strategy, he may file an action to collect rent
later using other legal avenues such as small claims court.2 16
214. The FDCPA states, in relevant part, a "debt collector shall . .. send the consumer ... a
statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity
of the debt.., the debt will be assumed to be valid." 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) (2000).
215. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-3804 (2005) ("If there is rent due for possession of the premises,
the petition [for eviction] may include a request for judgment for that amount or the plaintiff may
bring a subsequent lawsuit for that amount.").
216. The landlord's filing of an eviction action "shall not be a bar to any subsequent lawsuit
brought by either party for claims not included in such judgment." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-3802
(2005). Similarly, section 61-3804 leaves it to the discretion of the landlord to request back rent in
the eviction action. It provides: "the petition may include a request for judgment for that amount [of
back rent] or the plaintiff may bring a subsequent lawsuit for that amount." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-
3804.
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C. The Impact of the Bankruptcy Code2 17 on Evictions
Another area of federal law that could potentially impact residential
evictions is the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay found at 11 U.S.C. §
362(a).2 18 The relevant provision, section 362(a)(3), states that, upon the
filing of a bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay becomes immediately
effective against "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or
of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate.,219 Simply put, a residential tenant who files for bankruptcy and
who is being evicted by the landlord from his rental home is protected by
the automatic stay under federal law, thus immediately halting the state
eviction action.220 In many cases, the unfortunate result for the landlord
seeking to evict the tenant is that the tenant is not paying rent, but is
allowed to remain in the rental property until the landlord pursues proper
remedies in bankruptcy court. 1
Oftentimes, the landlord's hassle of dealing with the automatic stay
in the eviction context arises in an unsuspecting way. The following
scenario illustrates how the automatic stay can affect the state eviction
action and thereby prevent the landlord from gaining lawful possession
of his rental property. This all to common scenario involves a tenant
who has not paid monthly rent or vacated the leased premises despite the
landlord's issuance of the combined three-day notice under Kansas law.
After proper statutory notices have been issued to the tenant under state
law, 222 the landlord files an eviction action in state court seeking
possession of the rental property and back rent from the tenant. The
tenant is served with the petition for eviction and, soon thereafter, the
landlord is notified either in the tenant's answer or during the tenant's
first appearance in the eviction action that the tenant has filed for
bankruptcy. The revelation that the tenant is in the midst of a bankruptcy
217. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)
amends various provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (also amended in 1994). This brief
discussion of BAPCPA as it relates to state eviction laws highlights some key provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code and is in no way a comprehensive overview. It is strongly recommended that the
reader review the full text of the Bankruptcy Code and the BAPCPA amendments, which can be
found at II U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1532 (Supp. 2006).
218. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. 2006). The Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, amended in
1994, and amended again in 2005. Richard C. Maxwell & B.Webb King, Bankruptcy Law, 40 U.
RICH. L. REV. 53, 53 (2005).
219. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
220. Alan M. Ahart, The Inefficacy of the New Eviction Exceptions to the Automatic Stay, 80
AM. BANKR. L.J. 125, 126 (2006).
221. Id.
222. The landlord has presumably also complied with the notice requirements of the FDCPA if it
applies.
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may be daunting for the landlord and raises many questions about how
the landlord may proceed, if at all, with the eviction process.
Once the landlord is notified or becomes aware that the tenant has
filed for bankruptcy, it is important for the landlord's attorney to
determine how the tenant's bankruptcy will affect the state eviction
proceedings." 3 Likely, a state court judge will stay the eviction action
until he receives clarification from the bankruptcy court or trustee about
whether the state court has jurisdiction to proceed with the eviction
action. In any event, because the issue of federal law has presented itself
in the state eviction action, if the landlord wishes to continue with the
eviction process, he must seek the expertise of a lawyer to advise and
assist him in clarifying the status of the tenant's bankruptcy. More
frustratingly for the landlord is that he may also have to wait additional
time to gain lawful possession of his rental property.
In 2005, new amendments to the Bankruptcy Code known as the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA)
sought to address the prolific and systematic abuse and injustice of the
automatic stay which occurs in the residential eviction context as
described in the foregoing example.2 24 Specifically, two narrow eviction
exceptions to the automatic stay were enacted in 2005, but because the
creation of the two exceptions is fairly recent, it is difficult to assess
whether they provide landlords the relief Congress intended.
The first eviction exception, called the prepetition judgment
exception, allows a residential landlord, under certain circumstances, to
proceed with executing a judgment of possession against the tenant if the
225state judgment was obtained before the tenant filed for bankruptcy.
This exception to the automatic stay does not appear to be "automatic" in
the true sense. Rather, the exception includes tedious procedural steps
that must be taken in bankruptcy court before the landlord can safely
223. If the attorney representing the landlord in the state eviction case is unfamiliar with the
implications of the automatic stay, the attorney should seek counsel or assistance from an attorney
who is familiar with the Bankruptcy Code.
224. For further discussions of such problems, see generally John C. Anderson, Highlights of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005-Part I-Consumer Cases, 33
S.U. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2005); Christopher A. Camardello, Landlords, Tenants, and the New
Bankruptcy Amendments, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2005, at 20; Henry E. Hildebrand, III & Keith M.
Lundin, Selected Changes Affecting Consumer Bankruptcy Practice in the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 370, 373-79
(2005); Richardo I. Kilpatrick, Selected Creditor Issues Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 817, 821 (2005); Leases: New Law Aids
Landlords, REAL EST. L. REP., Aug. 2005, at 5; Patrick E. Mears & John T. Gregg, What Congress
Hath Wrought, PROB. & PROP., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 24-26.
225. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22) (Supp. 2006).
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proceed with executing the judgment and writ for possession.
Accordingly, the landlord's relief from the automatic stay under this
exception is not clear cut and may not be immediate, so it is critical for
the landlord to receive proper counsel from an attorney who is well-
versed in bankruptcy law and its new eviction exceptions to the
automatic stay before executing a state judgment for possession.
The second eviction exception to the automatic stay provides that the
landlord can proceed with an eviction action if the basis for the suit is the
tenant's illegal use of controlled substances or endangerment of
property. 226 Like the first eviction exception, there are certain mechanics
to this exception that must be considered but, on the whole, complying
with this exception appears less cumbersome than the prepetition
judgment exception. Again, the landlord should receive expert advice on
how to employ this exception, if indeed there is a basis for the landlord
to invoke it.
Though BAPCPA's two exceptions to the automatic stay were
enacted to alleviate the unfairness and injustices that many landlords face
as a result of a tenant's bankruptcy, one must wonder whether the
exceptions have fully resolved the possible financial hardship that a
landlord faces when a tenant fails to pay rent. In addition, it is debatable
whether the unavoidable inconvenience and expense of having to hire
competent legal counsel to address the technical procedures in
bankruptcy and state courts allow these burdens to truly be alleviated.
V. CONCLUSION
Anymore, the landlord-tenant relationship should be viewed with
trepidation from the landlord's perspective. In the state arena, the
landlord generally must adhere to strict compliance with the KRLTA and
the Eviction statute in handling all matters concerning tenants.
Otherwise, the landlord may be limited in the remedies he may seek
against the tenant in state court. As well, in some instances, such as
wrongful withholding of a tenant's security deposit, the court may in fact
sanction the landlord for noncompliance with the KRLTA. Complicating
matters further for the landlord is the mixture of federal and state law,
which poses additional challenges for the landlord and his attorney to
consider. In the eviction context especially, where nonpayment of rent is
the basis for the eviction action, the attorney representing the landlord
should be well-versed in Kansas law and the relevant federal statutes,
226. Id. § 362(b)(23).
970 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
such as the FDCPA and the newly amended Bankruptcy Code, so as to
provide competent legal representation to the landlord.
Similarly, there may be instances where the tenant should be wary of
the landlord-tenant relationship. For example, a landlord's inclusion of a
cancellation fee clause within the lease may produce unfair results for a
tenant who prematurely terminates a residential lease. Also, an
automatic lease renewal provision included within a lease may have
unintended consequences for a tenant who fails to comply with its terms.
Like all parties who enter into contracts, both the landlord and the tenant
should approach their lease agreement with full understanding of the
terms and the law to which they are bound.
